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Abstract  
This research deals with the contribution of good board practices to perceived 
business continuity in Tunisian corporate groups. This paper aims to identify the components 
of good board governance that can promote business continuity in Tunisian corporate groups 
through the study of the directors’ perceptions. Large Tunisian business groups form the 
pillars of the country economic development and reflect the ownership structure as well as 
the management style of Tunisian companies. In this regards, corporate governance and 
continuity issues are particularly important for Tunisian corporate groups. In this regards, 
Family-controlled businesses remain the predominant form of corporate groups in Tunisia. 
Good corporate governance can be a driver of business continuity by introducing good 
management practices allowing corporate groups to face succession problems and to 
improve company performance and its sustainability.  
  The conceptual study has allowed us to identify the components of good board 
governance: Principles (Responsibility, Transparency, Fairness and Accountability), Board 
Roles (Control and Strategist), Directors skills and Board procedures. The survey was 
conducted on a sample composed of 50 Tunisian corporate groups using a questionnaire 
designed to be filled by the directors and the top management members. The regression 
analysis revealed the perceived business continuity is positively related to Board Strategic 
Role, Directors Skills, Board Procedures and Board Accountability. However, the results 
showed that Board Control Role and Board Fairness are negatively linked to perceived 
business continuity in sampled Tunisian corporate groups. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Business Continuity, Corporate Groups 
JEL Classification: G34, M14, M10 
 
1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
This research focuses on the contribution of good corporate governance to the 
continuity of business groups in Tunisia. The continuity issue is very important for 
companies operating in developing economy as Tunisia. In this country, the majority of 
private companies are family-oriented and 75% of the 400 largest private companies are 
family businesses. 
In this regard, Tunisian firms don’t have solid traditions of succession - transmission, 
they are relatively "young" and few of them have successfully surpassed the stage of the 
second or the third generation. Corporate governance appears to be a solution to the 
succession problem. In this sense, several authors argue that corporate governance promotes 
survival, continuity, growth and sustainability of enterprises. Family businesses need a 
specifically tailored corporate governance approach that takes into account their specificities 
(Klein, 2010). 
Therefore, this paper aims to answer the following question: What are the components 
of corporate governance promoting business continuity in Tunisia? To provide a response to 
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this question, we have chosen to study large Tunisian business groups. They form the pillars 
of the country economic development and reflect the ownership structure as well as the 
management style of Tunisian companies.  
This research aims to identify the components of governance associated with the 
board of directors promoting the continuity of business groups in Tunisia. This paper is 
structured in two parts. We will present, in a first step, the theoretical framework of this 
research through the conceptual development of the perceived continuity as well as the 
elements associated with good board governance. This will lead us to formulate the research 
hypothesis. Besides, we will present the results of the empirical study and the lessons learned 
from this research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In Tunisia, corporate groups are generally family business having a closed ownership 
structure with management responsibilities insured by the founding owners (Fitch, 2005). 
These groups, often take the form of holding, are diversified and operate in different 
industries (industry, trade, tourism, etc.). The majority of Tunisian groups are under-
capitalized and highly leveraged (Fitch, 2005). 
The most common form of corporate group in Tunisia is the hypogroup structure 
(Bouderbala, 2005), defined by Debray (1997) as a group structure whose components are 
small businesses and linked by financial relations. These relationships give the holding 
company, the decision-making power over others and therefore it gives the owner-manager a 
central role and a final authority on the strategic management of the hypogroup. 
Tunisian corporate groups are characterized by a lack of transparency and a 
personalized way of management of the founders (Fitch, 2005). The majority of Tunisian 
corporate groups are led by the founder owner or by the founding family members. 
Management quality and organizational efficiency vary from one corporate group to another: 
Some corporate groups have modern structure, qualified managers and information systems 
which allow them to manage a large set of companies and activities, while other corporate 
groups continue to operate in a traditional mode based on the founders’ visions (Fitch, 2005; 
Srairi, 2003). The use of outside counsel and independent expertise still limited due to the 
reluctance of many group managers. 
 
2.1 Business Continuity  
Business continuity was defined by Srivastva and Fry (1992) as « the connectedness 
over time among organizational efforts and a sense or experience of ongoingness that links 
the past to the present and the present to future hopes and ideals ». 
Perceived future continuity of the business refers to the company ability to insure its 
sustainability and to provide future generations with wealth and employment (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2005; Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010; Cater & Justis, 2009; 
Short, Payne, Brigham, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 2009).  
The business continuity perception is related to the management ability to insure 
diligent resources allocation and demonstrate the financial soundness of the company (De 
Geus, 1997). It depends also on management ability to identify and manage risks and threats 
as well as to plan the future of the business through setting long-term strategies and 
succession plan (Mignon, 2010; Bonn, 2000).  
Family businesses are often more concerned with the long-term continuity of the 
business than non-family businesses are (Short, Payne, Brigham, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 2009; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). Family businesses place much emphasis on 
survival (Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009; Short Short, Payne, Brigham, Lumpkin, & Broberg, 
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2009), because the business is perceived as a long-term resource base to be used by multiple 
generations (Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009; Castillo & Wakefield, 2007).  
 
2.2 Good board governance  
A common definition of corporate governance is “the relationship among various 
participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations” (Monks & 
Minow, 2004). Concerning the governance of family business, Adendorff (2004) define it as 
“a system of processes and structures to direct, control, and account for the family and the 
family business at the highest level”. Picou and Rubach (2006) define corporate governance 
as "the entire rules, methods and incentives that will harmonize the accord between agent 
(executive board and management) and shareholders (those who supply capital)".  
Within the firm, corporate governance comprises three components: the shareholders 
assembly, the board of directors and the top management team. Even that the shareholders' 
assembly has main authority on company decisions, issues concerning corporate governance 
fall upon the board of directors given its pivotal role in directing and controlling companies 
(Cadbury, 1993; Brenes, Madrigal, & Requena, 2011).  
The literature review shows that many authors articulate the importance of Good 
board governance (Picou and Rubach, 2006; Barton and Young, 2006). In this regards, 
Peebles and Lockhart (2011) notice that "shareholders and stakeholders are increasingly 
holding boards responsible for value creation, as opposed to CEOs".  
The review of the literature shows many conceptions of the components of good 
board governance practices and board effectiveness drivers. Regarding to Levrau and Van 
den Berghe (2007), this divergence in board effectiveness studies is due to researchers’ 
different backgrounds as well as their heterogeneous research approaches to determine the 
concept of effectiveness. The literature's review shows many conceptions of the components 
of good board governance practices: 
 
Table 1: Synthesis of the literature review on good board governance 
Authors Good board governance / effective board 
Sonnenfeld (2002) 
Structural elements: regular Meeting Attendance, Board Size and 
Committees. 
Board Member Skills and Profiles  
Board behavior and culture : involvement, independence, openness, respect, 
trust   
Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) 
Human capital: knowledge, skills, abilities 
Structural capital: process, procedures, practices, routine 
Social capital: intra board, board management, extra organizational  
Board roles: Monitor & control, access to resources, strategizing, advice & 
counsel    
Levrau and Van den 
Berghe (2007) 
Culture : involvement, openness, critical, common values or goal, 
atmosphere-climate 
Individual norms: commitment, preparation, personality, independence 
Relationships among the board members: cohesiveness, respect, team, trust, 
contact 
Board Tasks (Roles): context, control, strategy, support  
Board composition: competence, complementarities, diversity, mix, size   
Board operations: meeting, preparation, chairmanship 
 
The various approaches focused on four main areas: 
 Board culture & values : Accountability, transparency, responsibility and fairness 
(Benham & He, 2010; Murthy, 2006; OECD, 2004; Watson, 2003). 
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 Board of directors role: control role as well as a strategist role (Nicholson & Kiel, 
2004). 
 Board human capital: Directors expertise and qualifications (Davies, 1999; Zandstra, 
2002) 
 Board procedures: Monitoring structures and reporting mechanisms (OECD, 2004). 
 
 
2.2.1 Board Culture and Values 
According to Chilliak (2014) “a culture of open debate, transparent sharing and 
grappling with the real issues, and responsibility to help develop strategy is absolutely 
essential to good governance”. To carry out their mission, Directors should share a culture 
and values based on generally accepted governance principles and standards: responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency (OECD, 2004; Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
 
Responsibility 
Within the board room, responsibility means that the directors recognize stakeholders’ 
rights such as provided by law and promote cooperation between the company and main 
stakeholders. The responsibility to the stakeholders enables the company to follow market 
and society trends and to have a thorough knowledge about the changing values of 
stakeholders (Ben Rejeb & Frioui, 2012). This can help companies to understand better their 
environment needs and to adapt their behaviors in order to survive. We can formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: The board responsibility has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
Accountability 
From a board room perspective, accountability is defined as the predisposition of the 
board Directors to provide explanations and justifications for the key stakeholders, concerned 
by its judgments, intentions, acts and omissions, if they call to do so (Arjoon, 2005). 
A board culture of accountability allows the company to increase stakeholders 
confidence which can ensure the support provided during crises that the company can pass 
through and thus, increase survival and longevity potential (Ben Rejeb & Frioui, 2012). We 
can advance the following hypothesis: 
H2: The board accountability has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
Fairness 
Given that the board must ensure the fairness in the execution of contracts between 
the company and the resource providers (OECD, 2004), fairness in board room means that 
Directors protect all the shareholders interests and ensure equitable treatment of their 
interests. According to Post, Preston & Sauter-Sachs (2002), the long-term survival of a firm 
are determined by its ability to establish and maintain relationships with its nexus of 
stakeholders. In this respect, a culture of fairness can promote longevity of the cooperative 
node between the company and its stakeholders; this has the effect of favouring the continuity 
of the firm. Therefore, we can advance the following hypothesis: 
H3: The board fairness has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
Transparency 
Transparency is a universal corporate governance principle. Board transparency 
means that the Directors perform their duties in a transparent manner, provides adequate 
disclosure and timely information to its stakeholders regarding their decisions, as well as, 
company operations and activities (Pahuja & Bhatia, 2010). A culture of transparency 
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encourages directors to make diligent decisions and to avoid any conflict of interest which 
has the effect to ensure the company sustainability. 
Scotland (2010) found nine key factors that contribute to the longevity of long-lasting 
Australian family enterprises including the ability to apply the principles of corporate 
governance such as transparency and disclosure. Thus, we can advance the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: The transparency has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
2.2.2 Board of Directors Role 
An efficient board can ensure firm global performance. Boards can bring a link 
between the firm and its environment, provides critical resources (Williamson, 1996; 
Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001), monitor management and help this latter to make strategic 
decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Davies, 1999; Kemp, 2006). A board performing these 
roles, can help the organization to achieve superior performance and therefore to ensure 
survival and longevity (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2001; Goktan, Kieschnick & Moussawi et 
al., 2006). 
A convergence through the corporate governance literature exists regarding the 
dependence of the board's effectiveness on the degree of implementation of its various roles 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). The literature review shows that boards play three main roles:  
 A control role: management oversight and monitoring (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Monks & Minow, 2004). 
 A strategic role: company strategic guidance and strategy approval (Judge & 
Zeithamal, 1992; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). 
 A service role: Networking, management team mentoring and counseling (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Davis & Cobb, 2010) 
The study of Ben Rejeb (2012) on the impact of board role on value creation in 
Tunisian companies did not find a significant effect of the board service role. The author 
explained this finding by the boards structure largely dominated by the main shareholders. 
For the purpose of this research, we will retain the role of control and the role of strategist. 
 
The board Control Role 
The board control role is at the heart of contractual corporate governance theories 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1979). This board role can insure the proper use 
of the company resources as well as the protection of the interests of the legitimate 
stakeholders (Ben Rejeb & Frioui, 2012). The board control role suggests that Directors are 
responsible for setting and enforcing budget restrictions and operating rules (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and overseeing strategy implementation (Rindova, 1999). Furthermore, 
directors are in charge of selecting, bonding, evaluating, compensating and replacing top 
managers (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000).  
Since the board is responsible for reducing opportunism and agency costs the 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and because directors sit at the apex of the 
organization, then it is expected that corporate continuity and survival is affected by 
corporate board attributes. 
Therefore, we can advance the following hypothesis: 
H5: The board control role has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
The Board Strategist Role 
Strategy is a central factor affecting firms success or failure (Porter, 1991). According 
to corporate governance cognitive theories, the board play a central role in identifying 
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opportunities and taking strategic decisions that enable the company to develop a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Charreaux, 2000). 
The board is involved in different issues relating to the company strategic 
management: defining company mission, vision and core values, setting objectives, 
formulating strategy (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001). Therein, strategic vision is a philosophy 
composed by a set of beliefs and core values, a clear and engaging aim and a projected image 
of a desired future (Collins & Porras, 1996; Ben Rejeb, 2012). The definition of a clear and 
shared strategic vision can help to trace the pathway of business continuity and expansion. 
Since the board of directors is responsible for the strategy development (Pass, 2004), then it 
is expected that corporate continuity and survival is affected by corporate board attributes. 
We can advance the following hypothesis: 
H6: The board strategist role has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
2.2.3 Board Human Capital 
Board human capital is the individual knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by 
directors (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). The board human capital is related to the director 
possession of due diligence abilities, strong industry and board experience as well as, 
reputation and relationship skills (Taylor, 2000). Nicholson and Kiel (2004) consider that 
board human capital is a pillar of board effectiveness framework.  
From a resource based view, the personal and intangible skills and competencies of 
directors, make of them a valuable resources for the firm (Barney, 1991). Regarding to Huse, 
Gabrielsson and Minichilli (2009), the existence of skilled directors can contribute "to secure 
company resources that may be valuable, rare, non-substitutable and inimitable in a way that 
may provide long term competitive advantage". In this regards, Ben Rejeb and Frioui (2012) 
found that director's qualifications, preparation, skills, competencies and experience has a 
positive effect on the stakeholder’s satisfaction in Tunisia listed companies. The board human 
capital can be considered as a characteristic of successful organisations since that it can help 
firms to collaborate with stakeholders and to adapt to their environment (Barrett, 1998; 
Collins & Porras, 1997; De Geus, 1999; Fitz-Enz, 1997). Therefore, we can advance the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: The board human capital has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
 
2.2.4 Board Procedures 
Board procedures can be defined as explicit and implicit codified knowledge as 
routines, policies, norms, processes and methods (Bontis, 1998; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). 
The board procedures are related to the various mechanical aspect of governance functions as 
board agenda, board meetings, documentation provided to directors, board charter and 
manuals. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) consider that board procedures among board 
effectiveness framework pillars. 
The existence of board procedures establish the regularity and diligence in the 
functioning of boards of directors to avoid the interest's conflicts, the opportunism and the 
managerial abuse. The research of Astrachan and Kolenko, (1994) found that there is a 
correlation between firms with governance practices, that included strategic plans, boards of 
directors, and the business longevity. We can advance the following hypothesis: 
H6: The board procedures has a positive effect on the business continuity. 
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3. Research Design and Methodology  
 
3.1 The Sample and Data Collection   
For this survey purpose, we choose to study corporate groups in Tunisia. Sraïri (2003) 
proposes a classification of Tunisian corporate groups based on the size criterion, measured 
through the number of companies in a single corporate group. Four categories are identified: 
micro groups (≤ 3 companies); small groups (4-5 enterprises); middle groups (6-10 business) 
and large groups (> 10 companies). 
Large Tunisian business groups form the pillars of the country economic development 
and reflect the ownership structure as well as the management style of Tunisian companies. 
In this regards, corporate governance and continuity issues are particularly important for 
Tunisian corporate groups. Besides, Family-controlled businesses remain the predominant 
form of corporate groups in Tunisia and are facing growth and succession challenges.  
According to the Tunisian Central Bank (2006), there are 116 large corporate groups 
in Tunisia. Given the limited number of large groups, we have tried to insure a  
comprehensive sampling. We chose a simple random probability sampling method (Zikmund, 
2003). Thus, we managed to get 50 questionnaires filled out; it represents 44% of the sample. 
 
3.2 The Measuring Instrument 
The questionnaire used for this research purpose includes a majority of items which 
the validity and the reliability have been confirmed in previous research. In some cases, 
where the scales were not available, items were developed on the basis of the literature in this 
field. Our dependent variable is the perceived business continuity, our independent variables 
are: the four values of board culture, the control role, the strategist role, the board human 
capital and the board procedures.  
 
Table 2: Operationalization of research variables 
Variable Items description  References  
Perceived 
business 
continuity  
(4 items)  
Risk and threats identification and 
management 
Soundness of the company  
Long-term planning : strategy and 
succession 
Diligent allocation of resources  
Venter, Van der Merwe & 
Farrington (2013); 
Farrington, Venter & 
Boshoff (2010) 
Responsibility 
(3 items) 
Recognizing the rights of stakeholders, 
promoting active cooperation with the 
stakeholders 
CLSA (2002)  
Accountability 
(3 items) 
Stakeholders accountability  
Adendorff (2008) ; CLSA 
(2002)  
Transparency 
(4 items)  
Disclosure of information’s related to the 
financial performance, ownership structure 
and governance 
Jongsureyapart (2006) ; 
CLSA (2006)  
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Fairness 
(4 items)  
Stakeholders interests protection and fair 
treatment 
CLSA (2002)  
Control role 
(5 items)  
Performance monitoring, control, 
opportunism minimization, manager 
evaluation 
Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona 
(2009); Huse (2007) ; Wan 
& Ong (2005) ;  Zahra & 
Pearce (1990) 
Strategist role 
5 items  
Defining the company vision and mission, 
strategic guidance 
Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona 
(2009); Huse (2007) ; Wan 
& Ong (2005) ;  Zahra & 
Pearce (1990) 
Board human 
capital 
(4 items)  
Directors skills, competencies, background 
and experience 
Forbes & Milliken (1999); 
Ingley & Van der Walt 
(2001) ; Hillman & Dalziel 
(2003); Adendorff (2008)   
Board 
procedures 
(3items) 
Existence of clear board responsibilities   
Existence of clear rules of governance  
Existence of documented procedure of the 
board 
Ingley and Van der Walt 
(2001) ; Adendorff (2008)   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Reliability and Validity of Measurement Scales 
The scales used in this research were subjected to a pre-test but also to the tests of 
validity and reliability. We tested the unidimensionality of the constructs through the factor 
analysis (CFA) with SPSS 20 and we evaluated the scales reliability through the Cronbach's 
alpha (Fink, 1995). As shown in table 3, the scales used show a Cronbach alpha greater than 
0.76 which reflect a good reliability. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of CFA 
Variable 
Average variance 
extracted 
Range of 
loading 
Composite 
reliability 
Perceived Business Continuity 
(PBC) 
64% 0.71-0.88 0.80 
Responsibility (RES) 82% 0.80-0.95 0.86 
Transparency (TR) 84% 0.90-0.95 0.94 
Fairness (FR) 63% 0.47-0.91 0.78 
Accountability (AC)  61% 0.48-0.93 0.75 
Control role (CR)  53% 0.54-0.89 0.77 
Strategist role (SR) 58% 0.54-0.88 0.82 
Board human capital (BHC) 61% 0.40-0.92 0.76 
Board Procedures (BP) 74% 0.75-0.93 0.82 
 
Table 4 shows significant correlations between the dependent and the independent 
variables. Overall, the correlation results are consistent with our hypothesis. Besides, there 
are no correlations above 0.9 confirming the absence of the problem of multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, and correlation 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. PBC 1         
2. RES -0.28* 1        
3. TR 0.51*** -0.06 1       
4. FR 0.27 -0.48*** 0.38** 1      
5. AC 0.64*** -0.32* 0.65*** 0.35** 1     
6. CR 0.33* 0.02 0.55*** 0.32* 0.58*** 1    
7. SR 0.68*** -0.25 0.26 0.42** 0.48*** 0.31* 1   
8. BHC 0.61*** -0.27 0.60*** 0.38** 0.48*** 0.57*** 0.35** 1  
9. BP 0.68*** -0.3* 0.62*** 0.33* 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.47*** 0.75*** 1 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.001 ; N=50 
 
 
4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Taking into account the nature of our model and the problem statement, the multiple 
regression technique seems to be the most appropriate method to perform the statistical 
analysis since it proposes to identify the effect of one or more independent variables on a 
dependant variable.  
Moreover, given the size of our sample, the method of regression is the most 
appropriate. Indeed, although it includes 50 observations, the sample size remains insufficient 
to use the structural equation modeling method and to produce relevant and generalizable 
results given the number of parameters included in the model. In this respect, this method 
requires a sample composed of 200 to 300 observations (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 
2006). Table 5 presents the results of two regressions: We ran two regressions: a multiple 
regression (Model 1), and a stepwise regression (Model 2). The stepwise regression technique 
will lead to optimal regression equation composed only by variables with significant 
contributions in explaining the perceived business continuity. 
 
Table 5: Results of regression analyses of stakeholder’s satisfaction 
 Model 1 
(Multiple regression) 
Model 2 
(stepwise regression) 
 Beta t-value Beta t-value 
Constant : Perceived business continuity (PBC)  0.33 0.56 0.58 1.19 
Responsibility (RES) 0.06 0.57   
Transparency (TR) 0.04 0.30   
Fairness (FR) -0.17 -1.77   
Accountability (AC)  0.39** 3.06 0.38*** 3.99 
Control role (MR) -0.38** -3.24 -0.34*** -3.44 
Strategist role (SR) 0.42*** 4.43 0.42*** 4.77 
Board human capital (BHC) 0.30* 2.58 0.30** 2.73 
Board Procedures (BP) 0.35* 2.54 0.33** 2.75 
R² 0.79 0.79 
Adjusted R² 0.75 0.76 
F-test 19.30*** 26.39*** 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.001 ; N=50 
 
The model is statistically significant and has good predictive capacity (R ² = 0.79, p 
<0.001). The results show that the perceived business continuity is significantly related to 
accountability, strategist role, board human capital as well as board procedures. Contrary to 
our expectation, we find a negative and statistically significant association between perceived 
business continuity and board control. The results doesn't reveal a significant link between 
perceived business continuity and three board values that are: fairness, transparency and 
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responsibility. Therefore, we did not find support for hypotheses H1, H3, H4 and H5; they 
cannot be confirmed. 
 
4.Conclusion 
In this study, we explored the association between good board governance practices 
and perceived business continuity in Tunisian corporate groups. By so doing, we sought to 
contribute to the current literature on corporate governance in developing economies.  
The results of the survey conducted on 50 Tunisian corporate groups partially 
validated hypotheses. Our results indicate a positive and significant association between the 
board culture of accountability, the board human capital, the board procedures, the strategist 
role of the board, and perceived business continuity in Tunisian corporate groups. However, 
contrary to our prediction, we didn’t find a statistically significant effect of three components 
of board culture which are fairness, transparency and responsibility and the results revealed a 
negative effect of the board control role on the perceived business continuity. 
Board human capital and board procedures contributes to the perceived business 
continuity meaning that the sustainability of the company and is dependent on the existence 
of formal mechanisms and clear monitoring rules as well as the skills and competencies of 
board members. Active and diligent boards composed by qualified and experienced directors 
increase the chances of survival of the company and the effective use of its assets. 
Regarding board culture, we found that accountability contributes positively to the 
perceived business continuity. Indeed, a culture of accountability within board room 
promotes more care and diligence at the decision-making process especially resource 
allocation and strategic choices. In this regard, authors suggest that accountability reduce 
over confidence among decision makers (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). In this sense, it has been 
shown that administrators show high levels of cognitive complexity when they are 
accountable to shareholders (Jensen, 1998; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989).  
A corporate group consists of a community of interests: those of the parent company, 
other affiliated enterprises and family businesses whether it is a family group. The 
relationship between officers of subsidiaries and group management nay board of directors' 
mixes relationships submission and independence, difficult to catalog (Pariente, 1993). That's 
why, it is important that each party affiliated to the group be accountable for its actions and 
decisions. 
We found that board strategist role is positively related to perceived business 
continuity. This result converges to Khanna and Palepu (1999) results which suggest that the 
counseling management is very important in groups in emerging economies because 
managers often lack the skills and appropriate expertise to run the business. 
Finally, we found a negative relationship between the board control role and the 
perceived business continuity that can be explained by the nature of family groups, the 
stewardship culture and the positive management entrenchment. Indeed, traditional agency 
problems are less important in family groups because of the unification of ownership and 
management (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). Therefore, board control focus can 
reduce the ability of governance to put emphasis on strategic orientation as well as long-term 
innovation. In this regard, Cadbury (2000) and Hansen & Hill (1991) suggest that mangers 
belonging to the families controlling groups invest in themselves more than their non-family 
counterparts. 
Confirming the relationship between good board governance and perceived business 
continuity in a developing economy context is important for many reasons: Our study is one 
of the few researches in the area that provides evidence of this association in a non-developed 
economy. Besides, this study showed that the board strategist role is determinant to business 
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continuity in Tunisian corporate groups while in developed economies, the traditional control 
role is often highlighted.  
Identifying the board governance components that can affect positively business 
continuity can help corporate groups and holding in developing economies to voluntarily 
improve their board practices to insure their longevity as well as a long term competitive 
advantage. The results of this study show that companies concerned about their continuity 
have to attract competent and qualified directors with diversified knowledge's. Furthermore, 
this study provides evidence that Tunisian corporate groups must have boards adopting an 
entrepreneurial approach by putting more emphasis on the strategic role rather than on the 
overseeing role. In addition, Tunisian corporate groups would benefit from a board culture of 
accountability and fairness to ensure better decision making process, efficient management of 
the stakeholders interests as well as diligent management of company resources. 
Our results should be viewed with caution. Indeed, some limitations make that the 
study findings cannot be generalized to all Tunisian companies. The business fabric in 
Tunisia is largely dominated by SMEs. Besides, in Tunisia, like the case of many developing 
economies, most companies show non advanced and often not formalized corporate 
governance practices.  
Although this study provides evidence on a positive relationship between good board 
governance and business continuity perception, it does not open the board "black box" to 
understand the process through which the board effectiveness can be insured. A more in-
depth research may be a future research allowing to explore this process. 
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